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The “Embarrassing” Section 134 
Frederick Mark Gedicks∗
Some years ago Sanford Levinson published an essay entitled, 
The Embarrassing Second Amendment.1 A well-known scholar of the 
left, Levinson regretfully concluded that the Framers understood the 
Second Amendment to protect precisely what the National Rifle 
Association has long maintained—an individual right to own 
weapons for the purpose of resisting violations of liberty by the 
federal government.2 This is “embarrassing” to gun-control liberals 
and others who argue that the Second Amendment protects a 
collective right that applies only in the context of state-controlled 
armed forces like the National Guard.3
It is in this spirit that I have entitled my comments “The 
‘Embarrassing’ Section 134.” I agree with Professor Smith that 
section 134 seems to reflect much of the thought of James Madison 
and the general spirit of his time,4 which is precisely the problem. 
There appear to be serious discontinuities between the Madisonian 
∗ Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I am 
grateful to Kif Augustine-Adams, Alan Keele, Lance Long, and (especially) Jack Welch for 
comments and criticisms of an earlier version of this essay. Kim Pearson, Shima Baradaran-
Robison, and Wade Taylor provided helpful research assistance. The views expressed herein do 
not necessarily reflect the views of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the J. 
Reuben Clark Law School, or the Brigham Young University Law Review. 
 1. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989). 
The Second Amendment declares, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of 
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. II. 
 2. See Levinson, supra note 1, at 650–51 (arguing that the Second Amendment reflects 
a “republican political order” which provides for “ordinary citizens [to] participate in the 
process of law enforcement and defense of liberty rather than rely on professionalized 
peacekeepers, whether we call them standing armies or police”). 
 3. See, e.g., id. at 644 (observing that liberal interest groups like the American Civil 
Liberties Union read the Second Amendment as protecting “only a state’s right,” and further 
maintain that “[e]xcept for lawful police and military purposes, the possession of weapons by 
individuals is not constitutionally protected”) (citations omitted). 
 4. Rodney K. Smith, James Madison, John Witherspoon, and Oliver Cowdery: The First 
Amendment and the 134th Section of the Doctrine and Covenants, 2003 BYU L. REV. 891, 934–
40. (concluding that Madison and Cowdery shared similar views on the nature of religious 
conscience, its precedence to governmental obligations, the circumstances in which it may 
properly be restricted, and its violation by the mingling of religious and civil authority). 
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understanding of conscience, which Professor Smith argues is 
evident in section 134, and the status of conscience among 
contemporary members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints. I will briefly discuss three: the contemporary church’s 
teaching that Latter-day Saints owe an unqualified allegiance to the 
law of the land, the general antipathy of Latter-day Saint (or “LDS”) 
lawyers toward the use of natural law and natural rights reasoning in 
interpreting the Constitution, and the contemporary church’s 
insistence that individual religious conscience be subordinated to the 
church’s institutional interests. Given the un-Madisonian view of 
individual conscience apparently reflected in the practices and 
attitudes of the contemporary church, Professor Smith’s 
demonstration of Madisonian influence on section 134 may be more 
cause for chagrin than celebration. 
1. 
The Twelfth Article of Faith declares that Latter-day Saints 
“believe in being subject to kings, presidents, rulers, and magistrates, 
in obeying, honoring and sustaining the law.”5 Section 58 of the 
Doctrine and Covenants is even more emphatic: “Let no man break 
the laws of the land, for he that keepeth the laws of God hath no 
need to break the laws of the land. Wherefore, be subject to the 
powers that be . . . .”6
At least since World War II, these scriptures have been 
understood to encourage, if not to command, an unqualified 
obedience to the law by Latter-day Saints, even when the law is 
deeply unjust. Helmuth Hübener, for example, was a Latter-day 
Saint teenager who was both executed by the Gestapo and 
excommunicated by German LDS authorities for anti-Nazi resistance 
activities.7 More than a half century later, Hübener is celebrated in 
 5. Articles of Faith 12 (Pearl of Great Price). 
 6. Doctrine and Covenants 58:21–22. See also Mark W. Cannon, Civic Duties, in 1 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM 285 (Daniel H. Ludlow ed., 1992) (“Members [of the LDS 
church] are obligated to respect governmental authority.”); accord Matt. 22:21 (King James) 
(“Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s.”); Titus 3:1 (King James) 
(counseling Christians to “be subject to principalities and powers,” and to “obey magistrates”); 
1 Pet. 2:13 (King James) (“Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man . . . .”). 
 7. For accounts of Hübener’s arrest and execution by the Nazis and his summary 
excommunication from the LDS Church, see KARL SCHNIBBE, WHEN TRUTH WAS TREASON: 
GERMAN YOUTH AGAINST HITLER (Blair R. Holmes & Alan F. Keele eds., 1995); Alan F. 
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Germany as a hero of the resistance,8 while LDS church leaders 
remain ambivalent about his actions.9 Similarly, during the 1960s, 
the civil disobedience of antiwar and civil rights activists was 
criticized by LDS leaders and members because it entailed conscious 
lawbreaking, although leaders did not disapprove of reform efforts 
Keele & Douglas F. Tobler, The Führer’s New Clothes: Helmuth Hübener and the Mormons in 
the Third Reich, SUNSTONE, Nov.–Dec. 1980, at 20. 
 8. Keele and Tobler report that because he was neither an adult intellectual nor a 
member of an anti-fascist organization, Hübener has come to symbolize among post-war 
German writers the “nonviolent, democratic, individual political initiative” and “personal 
moral responsibility” that could have prevented or terminated the Nazi regime. Keele & 
Tobler, supra note 7, at 26; see also id. (“If Hübeners are common in post-war German 
literature, it is precisely because there were so few in real life before.”); id. at 29 n.24 (noting 
that Hübener or “Hübener-types” occur in works by Böll, Grass, Hochhuth, Schallück, “and 
others”). In 1985, the city of Hamburg, Hübener’s birthplace, held a weeklong 
commemoration of his resistance activities in celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of his birth. 
See Huebener Group Lauded in Hamburg, SUNSTONE, Mar. 1985, at 48 [hereinafter Huebener 
Group]. 
 9. Although the First Presidency approved the posthumous restoration of Hübener’s 
membership by German LDS leaders following the war, see Keele & Tobler, supra note 7, at 
23–24, church authorities have declined to endorse the morality of his anti-Nazi resistance and 
seem uncomfortable with publicity given to Hübener in that respect. For example, BYU 
Professor Thomas Rogers was pressured by church leaders not to allow further production of 
his play dramatizing Hübener’s resistance activities following its initial successful run at 
Brigham Young University in 1977. See Huebener Group, supra note 8, at 49; Cecilia Warner, 
Helmuth Huebener: Antagonist or Protagonist?, SUNSTONE REV., Mar. 1984, at 3. When asked 
to comment on the incident, Elder Thomas S. Monson of the church’s governing Council of 
the Twelve is reported to have questioned the wisdom of examining Hübener’s life at all: 
“Who knows what was right or wrong then? I don’t know what we accomplish by dredging 
these things up and trying to sort them out.” Huebener Group, supra note 8, at 49. When a 
different play portraying Hübener was produced in Salt Lake City by an independent theater 
group, the LDS-Church-owned Deseret News declined to review it on “editorial” grounds, 
although it did publish two pre-production stories. See Warner, supra, at 4. 
Some of the official church reticence about Hübener may stem from the possibility that 
his anti-Nazi activities, however heroic and courageous, nevertheless put other Latter-day 
Saints at greater risk of persecution by the Nazi regime. Official discomfort with Hübener 
might also be attributed to fear that sensitive negotiations relating to recognition of the LDS 
Church by the former German Democratic Republic in the late 1970s might have been 
jeopardized by publicity about Latter-day Saint resistance to an earlier totalitarian regime. 
(Church leaders seem unconvinced that the anti-fascist character of Hübener’s resistance 
activities would have prevented the GDR from perceiving him as a subversive.) Even after the 
fall of communism, however, the church has been slow to embrace Hübener as part of its 
history. Hübener’s story is not related in any LDS church instruction manual, and has 
apparently never been recounted in a general conference talk or in another authoritative setting 
by church leaders. A recent notice in the church’s official newsweekly announcing a new film 
documentary about Hübener’s resistance activities may portend greater willingness on the part 
of the church to acknowledge Hübener and his story as a positive part of its heritage. See Sarah 
Jane Weaver, Documentary Reveals “Truth and Conviction,” CHURCH NEWS, Dec. 14, 2002, 
at 5. 
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undertaken through legal channels.10 Before the Berlin Wall fell in 
1989, Latter-day Saints trapped behind the Iron Curtain were 
counseled to obey the laws of the totalitarian regimes under which 
they lived, and similar counsel is given today to those who live under 
dictatorships and other authoritarian regimes that do not respect 
basic human rights.11
All this is in stark contrast to Madisonian political thought and, 
indeed, to some readings of section 134 itself. Latter-day Saints 
honor Madison and the other Founders as patriots—among the 
Saints the Constitution is equivalent to scripture, and the Founders 
enjoy a close-to-prophetic status.12 Like all revolutionaries, however, 
 10. For official disapproval of anti-war activism entailing civil disobedience, see, for 
example, Mary Jane Woodger, Commentary of the Leadership of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints During the Vietnam War, 23 J. AM. & COMP. CULTURES 53 (Spring 2000) 
(recounting condemnation of draft resistance and criticism of pacifism and conscientious 
objection by the First Presidency and other general authorities). See also Knud S. Larsen & 
Gary Schwendiman, The Vietnam War Through the Eyes of a Mormon Subculture, 3 DIALOGUE: 
J. MORMON THOUGHT 152, 156 (Autumn 1968) (reporting that BYU students surveyed in 
1967 were evenly split on whether anti-war demonstrations should be prohibited because they 
gave aid and comfort to North Vietnam). For disapproval of civil rights activism entailing civil 
disobedience, see Dallin H. Oaks, Law and Order—A Two-Way Street, 3 DIALOGUE: J. 
MORMON THOUGHT 59 (Winter 1968) (endorsing lawful demonstrations, but condemning 
all forms of civil disobedience except those designed to test the validity of a law whose 
constitutionality is in doubt). Letters to the editor published in the two major Salt Lake City 
dailies in the aftermath of the assassination of the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. often 
blamed Rev. King and the civil rights movement for racial violence. See, e.g., David A. King, 
Integration Takes Time, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 6, 1968, at A16; Budd Iverson, Leader of 
Violence, DESERET NEWS, Apr. 10, 1968, at 16A; Lillian Williams, Day of Mourning, DESERET 
NEWS, Apr. 11, 1968, at 22A; Leland S. Edwards, Benson for President?, DESERET NEWS, Apr. 
12, 1968, at 18A; see also Owen Olpin, Letter to the Editor, 3 DIALOGUE: J. MORMON 
THOUGHT 6 (Summer 1968). 
 11. For a summary and discussion of such counsel, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards 
an LDS Understanding of Church Autonomy, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE 
SURVEY 251, 255–59 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 2001). 
 12. See, e.g., President Ezra Taft Benson, The Constitution—A Glorious Standard, 
ENSIGN, May 1976, at 91, 93 (“I reverence the Constitution of the United States as a sacred 
document. To me its words are akin to the revelations of God, for God has placed his stamp of 
approval on the Constitution of this land. I testify that the God of heaven selected and sent 
some of his choicest spirits to lay the foundation of this government as a prologue to the 
restoration of the gospel and the second coming of our Savior.”); Elder Dallin H. Oaks, The 
Divinely Inspired Constitution, ENSIGN, Feb. 1992, at 68, 71 (“This inspired Constitution was 
established to provide a practical guarantee of these God-given rights [enumerated in the Bill 
of Rights], and the language implementing that godly objective is scriptural to me.”); 
President George Albert Smith, CONF. REP., Apr. 1948, at 182 (“[T]o me the Constitution of 
the United States of America is just as much from my Heavenly Father as the Ten 
Commandments.”). The principal scriptural warrant for treating the Constitution as having a 
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Madison and the Founders were traitors to their country. They 
justified rebellion against Great Britain because its king had failed to 
respect the “inalienable” or natural rights of the colonists, as the 
Declaration of Independence clearly sets forth. Section 134 endorses 
this same justification. It states that “no government can exist in 
peace” unless it protects natural rights—namely, “the free exercise of 
conscience, the right and control of property, and the protection of 
life.”13 It further declares that “all men are bound to sustain and 
uphold” the government where they live, but only “while protected 
in their inherent and inalienable rights” by such governments.14 It 
goes on to condemn “sedition and rebellion,” but again, only when 
undertaken by citizens “thus protected”15—that is, by citizens whose 
natural rights are respected by the government.16
In short, while section 134 does establish that citizens are 
obligated to sustain the laws of governments that protect religious 
free exercise, property, life, and other natural rights, it seems 
purposefully to refrain from condemning revolt by those whose 
natural rights are not respected by government, observing that such 
governments are condemned to endure agitation and rebellion. 
Madison and section 134 thus sound a discordant note against the 
contemporary LDS practice of honoring and obeying even unjust 
and repressive laws.  
2. 
The terms “natural law” and “natural rights” point to the 
projects of identifying and justifying universal moral principles and 
divine origin is Doctrine and Covenants 101:80, which declares that the Constitution was 
established “by the hands of wise men whom [God] raised up unto this very purpose.” 
 13. Doctrine and Covenants 134:2. 
 14. Id. at 134:5. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See also id. at 98:5 (“[T]hat law of the land which is constitutional, supporting that 
principle of freedom in maintaining rights and privileges, belongs to all mankind, and is 
justifiable before me.”), 134:7 (“[W]e do not believe that [rulers, states, and governments] 
have a right in justice to deprive citizens of [the free exercise of their religious belief], or 
proscribe them in their opinions, so long as a regard and reverence are shown to the laws and 
such religious opinions do not justify sedition nor conspiracy.”), 134:11 (stating that people 
“should appeal to the civil law for redress of all wrongs and grievances . . . where such laws 
exist as will protect the same,” but asserting that people “are justified in defending themselves, 
their friends, and property, and the government, from the unlawful assaults and encroachments 
of all persons in times of exigency”). 
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human rights on the basis of human reason and instinct.17 Some 
constitutional theorists have argued that judges may properly 
invalidate government action that violates natural laws or rights, even 
when such laws or rights are not set forth in the Constitution. 
Although a few of these theorists are politically conservative,18 most 
are associated with the left.19 Indeed, most contemporary 
conservatives have rejected natural law and natural rights 
jurisprudence.20 In contemporary constitutional discourse, “natural 
law” and “natural rights” are conservative code for unrestrained 
 17. Though often used synonymously, “natural law” and “natural rights” are 
conceptually distinct. Natural law reasoning refers to a moral theory that seeks to demonstrate 
universal moral laws by the exercise of human reason. See, e.g., “Natural law,” SIMON 
BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 256 (1996) (defining natural law 
theory as “any attempt to cement the moral and legal order together with the nature of the 
cosmos or the nature of human beings,” in which “[l]aw stands above and apart from the 
activities of human law-makers” and “constitutes an objective set of principles that can be seen 
true by ‘natural right’ or reason”); NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY IN LATE 
MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW 60–61 (2000) (defining natural law as “a system of precepts and 
prohibitions created by God,” which are “accessible to humankind through human reason, 
through revelation, and through instinct”). For a succinct survey of the classical to the 
contemporary in natural law theory, see Kenneth Einar Himma, Natural Law, INTERNET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/n/natlaw.htm (last 
visited July 30, 2002). 
Natural rights reasoning is a species of political theory which identifies human rights 
against government by the exercise of human reason. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA 
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 72 (1984): 
The natural rights theorist . . . claims to discover an intrinsic order in social 
relations . . . . For him the universals that describe this order—rights, rules, and 
institutional categories—have an existence and a worth quite independent of the 
particular interests that may take advantage of them. Thus, the natural rights thinker 
treats the system of private law concepts of contract and property or the doctrine of 
separation of powers in public law as if they had an autonomous logic that survived 
in all their transmutations. 
 18. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American 
Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928); Robert P. George, Colloquium, Natural 
Law, the Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2269 (2001). 
 19. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: 
Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); 
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987). 
 20. HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS 28 (1994) (observing that Justice Black’s rejection of 
natural rights and substantive due process “has found disciples in our own time mainly among 
conservative jurists like William Rehnquist”). Arkes himself is a supporter of natural rights. 
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judicial activism, especially by the Supreme Court.21 Such activism 
has historically borne conservative blame for the widely-condemned 
Lochner doctrine that blocked some social welfare legislation and 
other progressive initiatives in the early twentieth century.22 More 
recently, it has been the perceived source of aggressive judicial 
interpretations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment that constitutionalized individual 
privacy rights to unmarried sexual activity and largely unrestricted 
access to abortion;23 Latter-day Saint scholars have joined in these 
conservative criticisms.24 One suspects that, given the predominance 
 21. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 66 (1990) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence “is indistinguishable from a power to say 
what the natural law is and, in addition, to assume the power to enforce the judge’s version of 
that natural law against the people’s elected representatives”). 
 22. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905) (striking down state 
maximum-hour legislation as infringing upon the natural right of an individual to be “free in 
his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor”); see also Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589–90 (1897) (construing the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as protecting “not only the right of the citizen to be free from the 
mere physical restraint of his person,” but also “the right of the citizen to be free in the 
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where 
he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and 
for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his 
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned”). 
 23. See BORK, supra note 21, at 110–26 passim (cataloguing alleged interpretive 
excesses of the Warren and Burger Courts); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2497 
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s conclusion that state anti-sodomy laws 
lack a rational basis under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, on grounds 
that such laws fall “well within the range of traditional democratic action,” and “should not be 
stayed through the invention of a brand-new ‘constitutional right’ by a Court that is impatient 
of democratic change”); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998 
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the 
constitutional right to abort one’s pregnancy rests on a “principle of Realpolitik” rather than a 
principle of law). 
 24. E.g., REX E. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 188 (1981) (“[The 
privacy cases] and the abortion cases represent a resurrection of Lochner because they vest in 
the judiciary the license to roam at will through the territory of legislative policymaking. If an 
unmentioned constitutional right can be pieced together by the judiciary out of bits and scraps 
that bear some resemblance to a variety of other provisions in the Constitution, then there is 
little limit to the extent to which judges can substitute their own judgment for that of the 
legislature.”); LYNN D. WARDLE & MARY ANNE Q. WOOD, A LAWYER LOOKS AT ABORTION 
51 (1982) (criticizing the Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade for having relied on substantive due 
process analysis despite its discredited doctrinal pedigree and the severe academic and political 
criticism to which it has been subjected); see also LEE, supra, at 161 (calling the Due Process 
Clause the “wild card in the Supreme Court’s deck” because it “affords the most open-ended 
opportunity for judicial policymaking”); cf. Louis Midgley, The Search for Love: Lessons from the 
Catholic Debate over Moral Philosophy, 11 BYU STUD. 188 (Winter 1971) (arguing that the 
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of political conservatism among Latter-day Saints in general25 and 
BYU students in particular,26 most LDS lawyers and BYU law 
students understand “natural law” and “natural rights” reasoning as 
the foundation of a misguided and illegitimate jurisprudence that has 
ended in constitutional protection for morally problematic practices. 
Madison and the Framers, on the other hand, lived in a political 
culture in which the existence and binding force of natural law and 
natural rights reasoning were taken for granted.27 The Declaration of 
Independence, for example, can only be read as a natural rights 
argument.28 The anti-Federalists opposed the Constitution because it 
left natural rights without explicit textual protection,29 and there are 
Roman Catholic tradition of identifying the good through natural law reasoning is no longer 
an adequate response to the challenges of contemporary life). For a sympathetic use of natural 
law reasoning in Mormon theology, see Nathan Oman, Intelligences and Zion: An Essay in 
Mormon Political Philosophy (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 25. See, e.g., Dan Harrie, Mormon, GOP Link Doomed Democrats, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
Dec. 6, 2002, at C1 (reporting that the “overwhelming majority” of Utah Latter-day Saints 
voted Republican in the 2002 election, and that 56 percent of Utah voters polled identified 
themselves as Republicans, while only 19 percent identified themselves as Democrats), 
available at http://www.sltrib.com/2002/dec/12062002/utah/8688.htm (last visited Mar. 
10, 2003). 
 26. See Steve Hasson & Ken Meyers, How BYU Students Voted, DAILY UNIVERSE, Nov. 
5, 1992, at 1 (reporting that data from eight voting districts “predominantly populated by 
BYU students” showed that in the Election of 1992, 73 percent of those voting in the districts 
voted for George Bush, 17 percent for Ross Perot, 7 percent for Bill Clinton, and 3 percent for 
Bo Gritz). In a blind survey of a forty-two-student BYU jurisprudence class conducted by a 
member of the Law School faculty in January 2003, thirty-five students reported having voted 
for George Bush in the Election of 2000, three for Ralph Nader, and two for Al Gore, with 
two not reporting a choice. Cheryl B. Preston, Survey of Brigham Young University Law 
Students Enrolled in “Contemporary Jurisprudence Theory” (Jan. 2003) (on file with author). 
 27. See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 91–92 (1993); CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 
60–61 (1966); Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American 
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993). Professor Hamburger cautions, however, that 
natural law and natural rights had more precise meanings and implied a more constrained 
understanding of liberty in the eighteenth century than they do today. See id. at 908. 
According to Hamburger, the Founders understood natural law to consist “of reasoning about 
how to exercise and preserve natural liberty,” which was the “freedom an individual could 
enjoy as a human in the absence of government.” Id. at 918, 922. Natural rights were 
“portion[s] of this undifferentiated natural liberty.” Id. at 919; accord id. at 908. The 
Founders, therefore, understood natural rights to be subject to natural law. Id. at 908–09; see 
also id. at 923 (“Natural law, according to [late eighteenth century] Americans, was a type of 
reasoning about how individuals should use their freedom.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Nonsense and Natural Law, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
583, 593 (1996). 
 29. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 20 (1986); 1 MELVIN 
I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
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strong historical arguments that various clauses of the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights were understood at the time they were enacted 
to recognize or refer to unenumerated rights, including natural 
rights.30
The natural rights tradition continued unbroken from the 
founding era into the nineteenth century. In 1798, Justices Chase 
and Iredell carried on a spirited debate over the place of natural 
rights in the new constitutional order.31 In 1810, Justice Johnson 
declined to join the majority opinion upholding the validity of a land 
sale contract by reference to fundamental principles of common law 
and the Contracts Clause,32 insisting instead that such validity rested 
solely upon “a general principle, on the reason and nature of things: 
a principle which will impose laws even on the deity.”33 In 1823, 
Justice Washington, riding circuit, held that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV protected those rights “which 
are . . . fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free 
governments.”34 Justice Story’s monumental treatise on American 
constitutional law, published only two years before section 134 was 
canonized by the Latter-day Saints as scripture in 1835, presupposes 
THE UNITED STATES 112 (2d ed. 2002); see also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 301, at 274 (Rothman 1991) (1833) (“Among the 
defects [of the Constitution] which were enumerated, none attracted more attention, or were 
urged with more zeal, than the want of a distinct bill of rights, which should recognize the 
fundamental principles of a free republican government, and the right of the people to the 
enjoyment of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.”); Hamburger, supra note 
27, at 934–35 (“[A]ccording to Anti-Federalists, individuals had a legal right to the freedom 
of speech and press and their other natural liberties only to the degree they reserved these 
rights in their constitution or, less securely, provided for them in other civil law.”). 
 30. E.g., 1 STORY, supra note 29, § 506, at 486 (Preamble); Randy E. Barnett, 
Introduction: James Madison’s Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 
1 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989) (Ninth Amendment); James W. Ely, The Oxymoron 
Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. 
COMMENT. 315, 322–27 (1999) (Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); see also 
CURTIS, supra note 29, at 18 (“According to the Declaration [of Independence], people have 
unalienable rights to liberty. The ideology of the revolutionary generation shaped the later 
American Bill of Rights. This revolutionary ideology combined and wove together both the 
natural rights of man and the historic rights of Englishmen.”). 
 31. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
 32. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (majority opinion of 
Marshall, C.J.). 
 33. Id. at 143 (opinion of Johnson, J.). 
 34. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
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the existence of natural rights and their enforceability against the 
federal government as constitutional law.35
It is no surprise, then, that natural rights find their way into 
section 134. I have already discussed some of the natural rights 
mentioned in section 134.36 The section also enjoins government 
officials to enforce the law “in equity and justice,”37 and proclaims 
the government’s lack of authority to interfere with the “freedom of 
the soul.”38 Section 134 even replicates one of the Founders’ 
mistakes of natural rights reasoning, observing that it was “unlawful 
and unjust” to interfere in a slave-owner’s control of his property by 
preaching the Gospel to slaves, thereby conceding that black African 
slaves were not entitled to freedom of conscience and the other 
natural rights enjoyed by whites.39
There is deep irony in the indifference of politically conservative 
Latter-day Saints to natural law and natural rights jurisprudence. It is 
true that most contemporary heirs to the natural rights tradition are 
committed to left-leaning politics that conservative Latter-day Saints 
do not find congenial. But there is a vibrant conservative natural 
rights tradition that is equally ignored by LDS lawyers.40 Indeed, one 
 35. For example, Justice Story argues that one of the principle points of contention 
between Great Britain and the colonists was the former’s refusal to grant the latter all of the 
“privileges and immunities” of Englishmen, 1 STORY, supra note 29, § 156, at 139, including 
rights at English common law, 1 id. § 157, at 140, “the inherent rights and liberties of . . . 
natural born subjects,” 1 id. § 190, at 175 (citations omitted), and “essential rights,” 1 id. § 
191, at 176. He further suggests that this refusal was corrected by colonial independence and 
the eventual adoption of a Constitution and Bill of Rights that protected those very 
“fundamental” rights that the British had refused to recognize in the colonies. See 1 id. §§ 
304–05, at 277–78. 
 36. See supra text preceding and accompanying note 16. 
 37. Doctrine and Covenants 134:3. Although these terms sound in natural law and 
natural rights, it is possible that they referred only to the traditional division between law and 
equity in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
 38. Id. at 134:4. 
 39. Id. at 134:12. Although slavery itself is condemned elsewhere in Mormon scripture, 
see id. at 101:79, the LDS Church subsequently formalized a policy of denying priesthood 
ordination to those of black African descent. First articulated by Brigham Young in 1852, this 
policy was observed until 1978. See id. Off. Decl. 2. For a detailed account of the origins of 
this policy, see Lester E. Bush Jr., Mormonism’s Negro Doctrine: An Historical Overview, 8 
DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT 11 (1973). 
 40. See, e.g., HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION (1990); JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELL SHAW, BEYOND 
THE NEW MORALITY (3d ed. 1988); NATURAL LAW THEORY (Robert George ed., 1992). The 
authors of one basic jurisprudence text believe that a connection between natural law reasoning 
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of the most prominent LDS conservatives of the mid-twentieth 
century, J. Reuben Clark, was committed to a natural rights 
jurisprudence.41 Nevertheless, though LDS scripture teaches that the 
Framers were divinely inspired in their drafting of the Constitution 
and recognizes the existence of natural law and natural rights, the 
LDS response to natural law and natural rights jurisprudence is 
silence. 
3. 
I do not know if the LDS general authorities ever gave 
passionate sermons on “holding sacred the freedom of conscience,” 
as it is characterized by section 134,42 but they do not give such talks 
today. As Latter-day Saints know, contemporary general authority 
sermons emphasize obedience to ecclesiastical authority and loyalty 
to the institutional church above virtually every other value.43
and political conservatism is so widely assumed that it must be expressly disclaimed. See 
GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 119 (2d ed. 1995). 
 41. See Robert S. Wood & Stan A. Taylor, J. Reuben Clark, Jr., and the American 
Approach to Foreign Policy, 13 BYU STUD. 441, 443 (1973) (arguing that President Clark’s 
political thought was “but a variation” of a distinctly American view in which “politics is seen 
as being based on the postulate of a common human reason and universally and naturally-
based precepts of right”); FRANK W. FOX, J. REUBEN CLARK: THE PUBLIC YEARS 294 (1980) 
(quoting President Clark’s declaration, “I am a member of that class . . . that believes, if you 
will, that we the American people are the chosen of God for the perpetuation of a government 
which holds sacred those great fundamental inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.”); see generally G. Homer Durham, The Protection of All Flesh, ENSIGN, June 1976, 
at 42, 44–45 (arguing that the Constitution is a continuation of the natural law tradition of 
Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas). 
 42. Doctrine and Covenants 134:5. 
 43. See, e.g., Elder M. Russell Ballard, Beware of False Prophets and False Teachers, 
ENSIGN, Nov. 1999, at 62, 64 (“[I]n the Lord’s Church there is no such thing as a ‘loyal 
opposition.’ One is either for the kingdom of God and stands in defense of God’s prophets 
and apostles, or one stands opposed.”); Elder R. Conrad Schultz, Faith Obedience, ENSIGN, 
May 2002, at 29, 31 (declaring that no doctrine “is more critical to our well-being in this life 
and the next” than “unquestioning obedience” to the commandments of God as revealed 
through his prophets); Elder H. Ross Workman, Beware of Murmuring, ENSIGN, Nov. 2001, 
at 85 (“Obedience is essential to realize the blessings of the Lord, even if the purpose of the 
commandments is not understood.”); see also President Ezra Taft Benson, Fourteen 
Fundamentals in Following the Prophet, BYU Devotional Address (Feb. 26, 1980), available 
at http://library.lds.org/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates$fn=default.htm (declaring that the 
pronouncements of the Prophet preempt scripture, the pronouncements of past prophets, and 
human reason; that the pronouncements of the Prophet are necessarily true and correct; and 
that failure to follow the Prophet’s teachings amounts to serious sin); Elder Boyd K. Packer, 
Follow the Brethren, in SPEECHES OF THE YEAR 1 (1965) (“Avoid being critical of those 
serving in responsible priesthood callings. Show yourself to be loyal. Cultivate the disposition 
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The emphasis on loyalty to the leaders of the church and its 
institutional interests over reliance on individual conscience is wholly 
consistent with section 134, but not with Madisonian thought. 
Though it was often not explicitly stated, the Founders understood 
“freedom of conscience” to mean freedom of religious conscience.44 
Section 134 is thus directed primarily to the infringement of 
individual religious conscience by government and has little to say 
about rights of conscience against private organizations. Section 134 
rejects any right of religious associations to discipline their members 
by inflicting physical punishment or interfering with their property 
or other natural or civil rights, but it nevertheless affirms the right of 
such associations to expel nonconforming members.45 Madison, on 
the other hand, believed that individual conscience was prior to the 
demands of “civil society,” and not merely to those of government 
simpliciter.46 He clearly valued individual conscience over loyalty to 
to sustain and to bless. . . . Pray continually for your leaders. Never say ‘No’ to an opportunity 
to serve in the Church. If you are called to an assignment by one who has authority, there is 
but one answer. It is, of course, expected that you set forth clearly what your circumstances 
are, but any assignment that comes under call from your bishop or your stake president is a call 
that comes from the Lord.”), available at http://library.lds.org/nxt/gateway.dll?f= 
templates$fn=default.htm. Although Latter-day Saints generally disclaim that God requires 
“blind” obedience to the church and its leaders, a basic doctrinal tenet of the church holds that 
members should comply with the directions and teachings of the church and its leaders, even 
when one disagrees with them or does not understand the reason for them. See, e.g., Cheryl 
Brown, Obedience, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM, supra note 6, at 1021. Frequently 
cited as authority for this doctrine is an LDS scripture in which Adam is praised for performing 
ordinances despite being ignorant of their meaning and significance. See Moses 5:6 (Pearl of 
Great Price) (“And after many days an angel of the Lord appeared unto Adam, saying: Why 
dost thou offer sacrifices unto the Lord? And Adam said unto him: I know not, save the Lord 
commanded me.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 27, at 919 & nn.38–39 (summarizing founding-era 
statements which tended to conflate the free exercise of religion and the freedom of 
conscience, but which tended to distinguish both from the freedoms of speech and press). 
 45. Doctrine and Covenants 134:10. 
 46. See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 
(1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 82 & 1 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph 
Lerner eds. 1987): 
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as 
he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, both in order of time 
and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. . . . [E]very man who 
becomes a member of any particular Civil Society [must] do it with a saving of his 
allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that in matters of 
Religion, no mans [sic] right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that 
Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. 
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the collective, whether it was public or private.47 Indeed, the church 
that the Framers viewed with the most suspicion, with even greater 
suspicion than the Church of England, was the Roman Catholic 
Church—precisely that church which demanded unquestioning 
obedience to a hierarchical leader.48 That Joseph Smith himself was 
accused of “popery”49 only underlines the distance that Joseph’s 
contemporaries perceived between Madisonian thought, on the one 
hand, and the attitudes of the LDS Church, on the other. 
I am not suggesting that the priority of institutional loyalty to 
individual conscience is necessarily wrong, insofar as it describes the 
contemporary LDS Church. One of the points of having a living 
prophet is that he will presumably declare things that past prophets 
did not. And part of being a Latter-day Saint is accepting that we 
have a hierarchical governing structure that requires obedience to the 
President of the church, the First Presidency, and the Twelve 
Apostles as prophets, seers, and revelators of the divine will.50 Given 
the challenges of accelerated and international growth in the church, 
in the face of much cultural, political, and legal hostility, it is a 
 47. See Dante Germino, James Madison: Philosophical Pluralist, 27 MOD. AGE 42 
(1983) (arguing that the theory of pluralism argued by Madison, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, 
sought to preserve the uniqueness of individual thought from the pressure towards group 
conformity exerted by collective notions like “public interest” and “public vision”); see also 1 
UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 29, at 182–86 (contrasting Federalist and Republican 
reactions to the Sedition Act of 1798 and the Presidential Election of 1800). 
 48. See, e.g., JAMES HENNESEY, AMERICAN CATHOLICS 56 (1981) (quoting Samuel 
Adams as having declared that “much more is to be dreaded from the growth of Popery in 
America than from the Stamp Act”); see also Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams (1832) 
(“In the Papal system, Government and Religion are in a manner consolidated, & that is found 
to be the worst of Govts [sic].”), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 107 (Philip 
B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); cf. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 50 (James H. Tully ed., 1983) (1689) (“That Church can have no right to be 
tolerated by the Magistrate, which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter 
into it, do thereby, ipso facto, deliver themselves up to the Protection and Service of another 
Prince. For by this means the Magistrate would give way to the settling of a forreign [sic] 
Jurisdiction in his own Country . . . .”). 
The imposition of civil disabilities on Anglicans was rare following the Revolutionary 
War, whereas political and civil restrictions on Roman Catholics proliferated. See MARTIN 
MARTY, AN INVITATION TO AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORY 71–77 (1986); Stephen Vicchio, 
The Origins and Development of Anti-Catholicism in America, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
AMERICAN CATHOLIC CHURCH 85 (1989). 
 49. Roger Barrus, Politics: Political History, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM, 
supra note 6, at 1099. 
 50. JOHN A. WIDTSOE, PRIESTHOOD AND CHURCH GOVERNMENT IN THE CHURCH 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 262 (rev. ed. 1954). 
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reasonable judgment, to say the least, that obedience and loyalty are 
more important than individual conscience, religious or otherwise. 
What we must recognize in this regard, however, and what I would 
suggest to Professor Smith, is that this subordination of individual 
conscience to church collective is anti-Madisonian. 
* * * 
Given the LDS belief in an inspired Constitution, the tendency 
of Latter-day Saints to adopt the framers’ views as their own is 
understandable. But the framers were a diverse lot, and many of their 
beliefs, including their religious beliefs, are not compatible with 
contemporary LDS beliefs and practices. Before we as a church 
celebrate any discovery of Madisonian principles in section 134, 
perhaps we ought first to think carefully about whether we actually 
believe them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
